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ARTICLE

DIGGING OUT FROM UNDER SECTION 50-A:
THE INITIAL IMPACT OF PUBLIC ACCESS
TO POLICE MISCONDUCT RECORDS
IN NEW YORK STATE
CYNTHIA CONTI-COOK*

ABSTRACT
In the three-week period following May 25, 2020, the day Officer
Derek Chauvin killed George Floyd in south Minneapolis, a 44-year-old
piece of New York State legislation—whose repeal languished in both
Democrat-controlled state houses for years—went from being a long-shot
to signed law. The courage and leadership of families who lost loved ones
to police violence, the focused momentum built by organizers for years, and
the unrelenting energy of protesters responding to George Floyd’s murder
pressured New York legislators to finally repeal section 50-a on June 12,
2020. The impact of that sudden victory—implementation delays and failures aside—has been significant, even less than one year later. It does not
mean that transparency automatically ended police violence and other
abuses. But it has given people the power to demand information that police
have aggressively hidden for decades.1 That includes people who have experienced police violence or tragically lost their loved ones to it. It also
includes communities who witness routine police violence and want, for
example, to hold the officers, commanding officers, and elected officials
accountable for not preventing it. Community-based organizations, lawyers,
journalists, historians, academic researchers, and policymakers can all serve
the public better with access to data about police violence and other abuses.
* Cynthia Conti-Cook is a civil rights attorney, writer, professor, and researcher based in
New York City. She is currently a Technology Fellow at the Ford Foundation. The views and
opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not reflect and are not attributable in any way to those of the Ford Foundation.
1. Many family members who lost loved ones to police violence were involved in the fight
against 50-a. Some publicly and others more behind the scenes. I want to acknowledge early that
while I quote below from the public testimonies and interviews with some family members, many
others contributed.
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Responding to public pressure following repeal, even the New York Police
Department (NYPD) released its own police officer database,2 as did the
N.Y.C. Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB), the local police oversight agency.3
It may appear at quick glance as if transparency won and the 50-a
repeal can be celebrated as a historic transformation following George
Floyd’s death. But transparency is only the first step towards accountability
and a far journey from fully transforming public safety and ending police
violence. Transparency is also not guaranteed going forward—only robust
efforts to obtain and demonstrate the value of this information will protect
against future attempts to introduce new obstructions to public access. This
includes obstructions like the NYPD’s database, for example, which purports to embrace transparency but so narrowly defines the scope of what
“applicable” disciplinary information gets included on an officer’s profile
that officers with significant misconduct histories appear suddenly
spotless.4
To realize the potential that transparency makes possible, independent
databases that obtain, organize, and open police misconduct information
must be supported. These databases must also work in partnership with
community-based organizations to develop analyses that push beyond officer discipline.
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2. Officer Profile, NYPD ONLINE, https://nypdonline.org/link/2 (last visited Apr. 3, 2021).
3. NY Member of Service Records, CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BD. N.Y.C., https://www1.
nyc.gov/site/ccrb/policy/MOS-records.page (last visited Apr. 3, 2021). Both databases are only
searchable by officer name.
4. Ashley Southall, N.Y.P.D. Release Secret Misconduct Records After Repeal of Shield
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/08/nyregion/nypd-disciplinerecords.html (“But police reform advocates criticized the administration on Monday for continuing to withhold information about misconduct cases that did not result in a finding or admission of
guilt by the officer – the vast majority of the records – even after a federal appeals court made it
clear that the city could release them.”); Chris Glorioso & Kristina Pavlovic, I-Team: New Discipline Data Reveals NYPD Cops Rarely Penalized for Expensive Lawsuits, NBC N.Y. (Apr. 24,
2021), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/investigations/i-team-new-discipline-data-reveals-nypdcops-rarely-penalized-for-expensive-lawsuits/2999713/ (“A new database of NYPD disciplinary
records shows scores of cops have eluded workplace penalties despite being defendants in brutality cases that have cost New York City taxpayers millions of dollars.”).
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INTRODUCTION
Raucous protests were the catalyst for the full repeal of 50-a, the New
York State law that hid police misconduct from the public for decades. It
was signed into law on June 12, 2020, only because of a coordinated yearslong campaign.5
This article follows that victory to examine how the conversation
about police violence, policing, and public safety pivoted because of access
to even a fraction of reported police misconduct information. A wide range
of stakeholders have all analyzed and relied upon disciplinary records in the
past year, despite the many hurdles to implementation police departments
and unions have used to thwart access. It is undoubtedly crucial information
that broadens public conversations about incidents of police violence beyond the right or wrong of what actions the people involved in any given
incident took. These broader conversations also go beyond individual officer accountability to include accountability for the police institutions and
elected officials who fail to end the police violence that harms communities’ sense of safety.
Part I is an autopsy of the original legislation of 50-a and the history of
how it swelled to bury critical information about policing before spectacularly imploding. Part II presents the past year as a proof of concept; it re5. Luis Ferré-Sadurnı́ & Jesse McKinley, N.Y. Bans Chokeholds and Approves Other Measures to Restrict Police, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/ny
region/50a-repeal-police-floyd.html (“Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo signed the expansive package of
bills less than three weeks after Mr. Floyd’s death at the hands of the police in Minneapolis, which
has since sparked widespread civil unrest and demonstrations against police brutality and racism.”); Tom Robbins, How a Coalition of New York Activists Revealed Police-Department
Secrets, THE NEW YORKER (July 17, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-local-corre
spondents/how-a-coalition-of-new-york-activists-revealed-police-department-secrets; Stephanie
Wykstra, The Fight for Transparency in Police Misconduct, Explained, VOX (June 16, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/2020/6/16/21291595/new-york-section-50-a-police-misconduct. A
Wikipedia entry for 50-a claims that mass emails from college students influenced the government
as well. 50-a, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/50-a (last visited Sept. 12, 2021).
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views how the impact of public access to police misconduct information
following repeal has already given important texture and specificity to conversations about police violence, policing, and public safety, despite obstructive police union lawsuits and implementation failures by departments
statewide. Part III argues that, despite some departments’ embrace of transparency rhetoric and construction of “official” databases of police misconduct, it is important for independent organizations to still obtain, organize,
and open public databases to stress test the government’s transparency
claims, to analyze information beyond whether any individual officer has
the propensity to harm people, and to pursue accountability up the chain of
command to elected officials.
SCOPE

OF

ANALYSIS

New York is the focal point of this story, but it is not the only jurisdiction
battling over police misconduct information. California passed a law in
2018 that opened up a limited number of police misconduct complaints if
they included allegations of use of force, perjury, or sexual misconduct.6
Connecticut passed legislation in July 2020 that prohibited collective bargaining agreements from blocking disclosure of certain misconduct files.7
New Orleans City Council adopted a resolution calling for a public police
misconduct database, as did Oregon and Colorado.8 Legislation similar to
50-a is also pending in New Jersey, and the New Jersey Attorney General
released a limited officer use of force database.9 Maryland repealed its ver6. Liam Dillon, California Legislature Passes Major Police Transparency Measures on Internal Investigations and Body Cameras, THE L.A. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.latimes.
com/politics/la-pol-ca-police-transparency-bill-passes-20180831-story.html. As in New York, efforts are underway for this information to be collected. The California Reporting Project, THE
CAL. REPORTING PROJECT, https://projects.scpr.org/california-reporting-project/ (last visited Sept.
12, 2021) (The California Reporting Project “is a statewide coalition of 40 newsrooms committed
to working together to obtain and report on police records newly available to the public.”).
7. OLR BILL ANALYSIS HB 6004 EMERGENCY CERTIFICATION §§ 8, 9 (2020). The Connecticut State Police Union sued the state to block disclosures through an injunction. Kelan Lyons,
State Police Union Sues Connecticut Over Police Accountability Bill, THE CT MIRROR (Aug. 12,
2020), https://ctmirror.org/2020/08/12/state-police-union-sues-connecticut-over-police-accounta
bility-bill/. A federal judge dismissed that lawsuit in October 2020. Conn. State Police Union v.
Rovella, 494 F. Supp. 3d 210, 210 (D. Conn. 2020). The police union plans to appeal that decision. Cassandra Bassler, Conn. State Police Union To Challenge Officer Complaint Disclosures,
WSHU PUBLIC RADIO (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.wshu.org/post/conn-state-police-union-chal
lenge-officer-complaint-disclosures#stream/0.
8. Jason Rogers Williams & Helena Moreno, New Orleans City Council Calls for New
Public Database on Police Misconduct, NEW ORLEANS CITY COUNCIL (June 18, 2020), https://
council.nola.gov/news/june-2020/new-orleans-city-council-calls-for-new-public-data/; Andrew
Selsky, Oregon Releases Police Misconduct Records, Others to Follow Suit, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (July 14, 2020), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2020/0714/Oregon-releasespolice-misconduct-records-others-to-follow-suit.
9. SASLogon, SAS® LOGON MANAGER, https://sva.lps.nj.gov/SASLogon/login (last visited
Sept. 11, 2021).
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sion of 50-a, originally signed into law in 1972.10 Campaigns in Michigan,
Ohio, Oregon, and Delaware are also underway to lift legal barriers to obtaining police misconduct data.11 Regardless of what state transparency
laws get passed nationwide, the lessons learned following the implementation of 50-a’s repeal still apply. Databases run independently from the government are still needed to obtain, organize, and open police misconduct
data to manifest the intent of the transparency reforms.12
DEFINITIONS

OF

TERMS

“Police misconduct information or data,” used interchangeably in this
article, refers to any act that would qualify as a “prior bad act” for the
purposes of impeachment of any witness in a courtroom.13 A “prior bad
act” demonstrates “an untruthful bent or significantly reveals a willingness
or disposition . . . voluntarily to place the advancement of his individual
self-interest ahead of principle or the interests of society.”14 That definition
includes conduct that is and is not violent and is and is not criminal, such as
lying or abusive language. It includes conduct that is documented in lawsuits, criminal court suppression decisions, and recordings by neighborhood
CopWatchers as well as Internal Affairs and CCRB records. In other words,
the way this article uses police misconduct information contemplates information known to police departments beyond complaints investigated by
government agencies. “Disciplinary outcomes or data,” on the other hand,
refers exclusively to the official report of misconduct to a government
agency and the administrative disciplinary outcome and penalty, if any, by
that agency.
“Public access” is used throughout this article to refer to information
that is in theory legally accessible. But what is legally accessible public
10. Michael Levenson & Bryan Pietsch, Maryland Passes Sweeping Police Reform Legislation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/10/us/maryland-police-re
form.html; Ovetta Wiggins & Erin Cox, Maryland Repeals Police Bill of Rights, Enacts Historic
Accountability Measures, THE WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/md-politics/hogan-vetoes-police-accountibility/2021/04/09/c0ac4096-9967-11eb-962b78c1d8228819_story.html (“open some allegations of police wrongdoing for public review”).
11. Selsky, supra note 8; Repeal LEOBR, ACLU MD., https://action.aclu.org/send-message/
repeal-leobr (last visited Sept. 11, 2021); Tyrone Carter, Opinion: Make Police Misconduct Complaints Public for Transparency, THE DETROIT NEWS (Sept. 26, 2020), https://www.detroit
news.com/story/opinion/2020/09/26/opinion-make-police-misconduct-complaints-public-trans
parency/3530268001/; Brandon Simmons & Hope Sloop, Gov. Mike DeWine Announces New Bill
to Help With ‘Accountability and Transparency’ in Policing, 3 WKYC STUDIOS (Apr. 21, 2021),
https://www.wkyc.com/article/news/local/ohio/governor-dewine-police-transperancy-bill/95-2e7f
654b-126a-432a-b646-455fc0a74183.
12. Cynthia H. Conti-Cook, Open Data Policing, 106 GEO. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 16 (2017)
(generally discussing how misconduct data should not be limited to data collected by government
agencies and reviewing all the various sources of misconduct data beyond government
information).
13. People v. Walker, 633 N.E.2d 472, 474 (N.Y. 1994).
14. Id.
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information versus what information the public can reasonably and regularly access to form opinions, organize others, and launch campaigns for
policy change are two entirely different matters. Tactics to deter the public
from seeking information, like the upstate New York police department that
charged thousands of dollars for records, should be anticipated amongst
other obstructions.15 Generally, individuals and organizations without access to lawyers willing to bring these cases are not going to pursue legal
recourse when their requests for information are denied, and many wrongfully denied requests for “public access” to misconduct information will
never be reviewed.
Even when an organization is successful in obtaining a large volume of
police misconduct information, it is almost never delivered in a format that
easily translates to “public access” in any meaningful way. This data is
often delivered in hard copy or Portable Document Format (PDF) with
thousands of pages of unsorted information. Organizations like Human
Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG)16 and Public Data Works (PDW)17
have cultivated an expertise in deploying various data processing tools, for
example, using Optical Character Recognition (OCR) to make PDFs scannable, using Natural Language Processing (NLP) to identify recurring terms
in complaint narratives, and then deploying Machine Learning (ML) to categorize complaints according to determined tags with filters, and these steps
are on top of already onerous general data cleaning tasks that still come
when data is delivered in comma-separated-values files (for example, Excel
spreadsheets). Even with these tools, this is laborious work that requires
unique and expensive expertise. This technical assistance allows organizations to publish databases that function for multiple stakeholders from the
public for multiple purposes.
Data released this past year because 50-a was repealed is discussed at
length and will be referred to throughout various sections of this article in a
few different ways. We have barely scratched the surface of the existing
15. Jon Campbell & Beryl Lipton, New York 50-a Repeal: Six Months Later, Police Find
Ways to Shield Disciplinary Records, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Dec. 22, 2020), https://
www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/politics/albany/2020/12/22/new-york-state-50-a-re
peal-six-months-later-police-shielding-public-records/3964062001/ (“In June, the Manlius Police
Department received an open-records request from MuckRock, a nonprofit news site. The request
sought documents detailing any allegations of misconduct against current or former officers and
any discipline the department imposed. The department replied with a bill. For $47,505.”).
16. USA, HUM. RTS. DATA ANALYSIS GRP., https://hrdag.org/usa/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2021)
(“Current work includes ongoing collaboration with several US-based partners. We are working
with the Invisible Institute’s Citizens Police Data Project to design and maintain a data pipeline, to
systematically process large quantities of documents describing potential police misconduct in
Chicago.”).
17. Public Data Works, PUB. DATA WORKS, https://publicdata.works/ (last visited Sept. 11,
2021) (“Public Data Works is a data+design workshop. We build tools that help make data useful
to the public, using transparency to transfer power and radically rethink the dynamics of
accountability.”).
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data. The NYPD is taking an average of six months to respond to open
records requests, although it has already denied at least one request for a
“downloadable copy of misconduct records” dataset (on March 24, 2021,
after the litigation ended).18 The dataset referred to throughout this article
as “limited dataset” or the “ProPublica data” is based on a subset of CCRB
data, released by ProPublica last summer.19 Other examples of misconduct
data used in reports discussed may have been obtained directly by a reporter, whether through records requests or inquiries to the Deputy Commissioner of Public Information (DCPI) of the NYPD.
RESPONSE

TO

POLICE PRIVACY CLAIMS

Police claims to privacy rights in their misconduct records is the most
commonly named opposition against transparency reforms. Police claims to
privacy for their misconduct are about power, not privacy. Legal scholar
Anita L. Allen, an expert in the history of privacy law in the United States,
writes about how racial and gender social power dynamics impact the legal
analysis of privacy law. Her scholarship recounts a criminal court decision
from 1829 dismissing charges against a “prominent slave-holding Confederate family” based on “[the] ideal of privacy . . . to help rationalize the
court’s unwillingness to punish a white man for whipping and shooting a
slave.”20 Much like police violence in Black communities in the United
States, “[b]loody vengeance [was] heaped upon defiant slaves ‘with impunity, by reason of its privacy.’”21 Police, prosecutors, and courts have too
often echoed similar justifications for withholding information about police
misconduct as, in the words of Justice Cobb in 1829, “[the] power of the
master must be absolute, to render the submission of the slave perfect.”22
Sergeant Benevolent Association President Edward Mullins’s op-ed opposing 50-a repeal in 2019 shadowed this rationale in describing NYPD’s need
for absolute power over the communities they police. He claimed 50-a was
required due to “the unique nature of the work of law enforcement professionals and first responders, who daily risk their lives for the common good
and who can’t do their jobs without the community’s support.”23 Support
18. Explore OpenRecords Requests, OPENRECORDS, https://a860-openrecords.nyc.gov/re
quest/view_all (last visited Sept. 11, 2021). Query for records requests from June 2020 until the
present, April 30, 2020, from the NYPD for “misconduct” resulted in a request for “downloadable
copy of misconduct records” being denied (FOIL-2021-056-04395). The basis for the denial was
inaccessible online. Not all records requests are made through this portal, but it provides a decent
sampling of how the NYPD is responding to these requests.
19. See infra p. 63 and note 82.
20. Anita Allen, Natural Law, Slavery, and the Right to Privacy Tort, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
1187, 1204 (2012) (discussing State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263 (1829)).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Ed Mullins, Don’t Let Activists and Lawyers Weaponize Police-Discipline Records, THE
N.Y. POST (Apr. 14, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/04/14/dont-let-activists-and-lawyersweaponize-police-discipline-records/.
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meaning unquestioning subservience achieved through fear rather than public trust. Yet when tested by courts this past year in police union lawsuits,
officers’ claims to legal protections for privacy interests fell apart without
50-a’s fabricated “privacy” protection.24
Police officers’ claims to privacy were also shot down substantively by
many department administrators. A recent research survey by Professors
Rachel Moran and Jessica Hodge of 344 law enforcement administrators in
twelve states with open records laws “about the benefits and harms of making law enforcement misconduct records accessible to the public”25 found
that “[m]ore administrators than not said they support laws requiring public
access to misconduct records.”26 This support is attributed to meaningful
benefits of transparency, including improved community relations and public trust.27 The main harm some administrators identified were reputational—there was “even slighter evidence of physical harm.”28 As District
Court Judge Katherine Failla put it simply in her decision dismissing the
Police Benevolent Association’s (PBA) petition for an injunction preventing the New York City’s databases from disclosure, there is just not “a
generalized privacy right inherent in the disciplinary records of public employees.”29 That this is not true for the work-related misconduct of all citizens does not matter. “Government, public officials, and large commercial
institutions are accountable to the general public in respects that are not
strictly reciprocal. Subject to important exceptions, the secrecy preferences
of these actors easily yield to the public’s demand for accountability.”30
These italics are mine—this basic privacy principle exposes the past years’
struggle to repeal 50-a that much more clearly as one about power.
ACCOUNTABILITY BEYOND INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS
Accountability should not only be understood as a mechanism targeting individual officers for their actions, but as a mechanism through which
elected officials are held accountable for the actions of police officers. This
also extends to supervisors and other police officials pressuring officers to
take action in violation of people’s rights or who look the other way when
24. Cynthia H. Conti-Cook, A New Balance: Weighing Harms of Hiding Police Disciplinary
Records from the Public, 22 CUNY L. REV. 148, 175–180 (2019) (for more in-depth discussion of
privacy law as it applies to police misconduct information).
25. Rachel Moran & Jessica Hodge, Law Enforcement Perspectives on Public Access to Misconduct Records, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237, 1240 (2021) (available at Law Enforcement Perspectives on Public Access to Misconduct Records, SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3552012 (last revised Nov. 4, 2021)).
26. Id. at 1241.
27. Id. at 1268.
28. Id. at 1280.
29. Uniformed Fire Officers Ass’n v. DeBlasio, No. 20 CIV. 5441 (KPF), 2020 WL 5640063
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2020).
30. ANITA ALLEN, WHY PRIVACY ISN’T EVERYTHING: FEMINIST REFLECTIONS ON PERSONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY 31 (2003).
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they witness it routinely happen. These officials, including elected officials,
often even more so than the individual officers themselves, should be held
accountable for police violence and other abuses. NYPD and CCRB’s
databases both only facilitate searches for information in relation to the officer accused, and not in relation to supervisors, to chain of command, or to
recurring types of misconduct that may pervade the entire department. Accountability, as conceived of for the purposes of this article, is for everyone,
including the concept of policing itself.31
To achieve accountability beyond individual officers, there must be
transparency beyond individual officers’ profiles. In the first-year post-50-a
repeal, let us think expansively about what a new potential expectation for
government transparency could be, especially around policing and public
safety. We have already witnessed the harm secrecy caused—to families
fighting for information about the cause of their loved one’s death and anyone relying on the legal system to deliver justice. Secrecy also prevents
members of the public from engaging in democratic debate about a tragic
and recurring type of government misconduct with information that may
reveal how often people in government actively participate in obstructing
accountability efforts.32
Hiding evidence of police violence in Black communities specifically
also protects officers who intentionally veil their biases with their badges.33
Now that 50-a is repealed, we have the opportunity to build on Ida B.
Wells’ faith in the power of publicity—to publish the details of every
lynching so
31. Many people have written persuasive arguments for rethinking the role of policing in
community safety. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003); Rachel Kushner, Is
Prison Necessary? Ruth Wilson Gilmore Might Change Your Mind, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 17,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/magazine/prison-abolition-ruth-wilson-gilmore.html;
ANDREA J. RITCHIE, INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR (2017); ALEX S. VITALE, THE END OF POLICING (2017); The Graduate Center,
CUNY, A World Without Prisons: Ruth Wilson Gilmore in Conversation with Mariame Kaba,
FACEBOOK (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=1031007084026178
&ref=watch_permalink; and many more publications available on Interrupting Criminalization,
INTERRUPTING CRIMINALIZATION, https://www.interruptingcriminalization.com/ (last visited Sept.
11, 2021).
32. Conti-Cook, supra note 24, at 148, 159, 164, 167, 191 (discussing the harms of police
secrecy to various constituencies); Robbins, supra note 5.
33. Peter Bouisseau, Anti-Black Police Violence Rooted in the Slave Trade: Harvard Researcher, UNIV. OF TORONTO (Feb. 29, 2021), https://www.utoronto.ca/news/anti-black-police-vio
lence-rooted-slave-trade-harvard-researcher (“Police violence against Black people can be traced
to the brutal slave trade led by Europe’s great powers centuries ago, says award-winning author
and historian Professor Vincent Brown of Harvard University. . . ‘The relative obscurity of these
events is also due to the reluctance to acknowledge slavery as an act of war,’ said Brown, adding
that the social antagonisms established by slavery persist to this day as the descendants of slaves
fight for the space to develop their own notions of belonging, status and fairness. ‘Few things
terrify the wealthy and powerful more than the prospect of losses to the poor and the weak, which
would signify dishonour and a world turned upside down.’”).
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the public could know that an influential body of citizens has
made it a duty to give the widest publicity to the facts in each
case; that it will make an effort to secure expressions of opinion
all over the country against lynching for the sake of the country’s
fair name; and lastly, but by no means least, to try to influence the
daily papers of the country to refuse to become accessory to mobs
either before or after the fact.34
Younger generations will hopefully also learn from these database
archives to structure crisis intervention and imagine community safety in
new and less militarized ways. Unlike the official databases that, so far,
only connect misconduct to officers involved in any incident, these independent databases have the capacity to connect misconduct from multiple
sources to command structures, groupings of officers, and types of misconduct, including misconduct reported in lawsuits and criminal legal decisions. Deeper connections in this data will surface a new type of
transparency and new opportunities for understanding police departments’
ability (and inability) to prevent violence, even by their own members.
PART I - AN AUTOPSY

OF

NEW YORK’S SECRECY LAW

Before counting the many ways access to data post-repeal has changed
the conversation about policing, justice, and safety in New York, it is worth
retracing our steps historically to recall how police in New York were able
to bury their crimes for decades. Following the civil rights movement and
significant expansions to the constitutional rights of people accused of
crimes by the United States Supreme Court in the 1960s, namely to have
free access to assigned counsel and to hold hearings about how officers
obtained evidence and confessions, police officers’ conduct was under scrutiny from official actors outside of the police department for the first time.35
Co-opting many of the strategies, slogans, and spiritual themes of the civil
and labor rights movements, police started organizing their unionizing campaigns around the idea that police officers had their own “sacred” civil
rights that buried their misconduct information and made holding officers
individually accountable for misconduct more difficult.36 When Freedom of
34. (1909) Ida B. Wells, “Lynching Our National Crime”, BLACK PAST (Sept. 22, 2008),
https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/1909-ida-b-wells-awful-slaughter/.
35. Nick Pinto, How New York’s Law Shielding Cops From Scrutiny Became One Of The
Toughest In The Country, GOTHAMIST (Mar. 10, 2020), https://gothamist.com/news/ny-policenypd-50a-cops-crime (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
36. Id. (not unlike how modern police unions co-opted the modern call for racial justice
“Black Lives Matter’’ into “Blue Lives Matter”); Rebecca Brown & Cynthia Conti-Cook, Crime
Without Punishment, AM. BAR ASS’N (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/
publications/human_rights_magazine_home/civil-rights-reimagining-policing/crime-without-punishment/ (identifying additional protections under expansive “Law Enforcement Officer Bill of
Rights” (LOBR) provisions); Rebecca Tan, There’s a Reason It’s Hard to Discipline Police. It
Started With a Bill of Rights 47 Years Ago., THE WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2020) https://
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Information laws started to pass across the country in the 1970s, unions
started to push for exceptions for their records based on their claims to
uniquely needed sacred “privacy” rights, capitalizing off of how newly exposed officers felt in the courtroom.37
A. The Origins and Judicial Expansion of Section 50-a
While 50-a’s original sponsor38 and many contemporary reporters
framed the 1976 legislators’ oversight of 50-a’s expansive interpretation as
an unintended consequence, Nick Pinto’s research brought him to the opposite conclusion: “[i]t’s true that courts have greatly increased the scope of
50-A’s application over the years. But legislators in 1976 had ample warning that this law could play havoc with police accountability.”39 Pinto
quotes multiple legislators from the debate floor who predicted that 50-a
would obstruct efforts to hold police accountable and deliver due process
through the criminal justice system.40
www.washingtonpost.com/history/2020/08/29/police-bill-of-rights-officers-discipline-maryland/
(“For more than four decades, critics say, the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights has been
one of the biggest obstructions to police accountability, hindering investigations and shielding
misconduct from public scrutiny. Fifteen other states followed Maryland in adopting a police bill
of rights. . .”).
37. This copy-cat strategy is demonstrated today by the police-led campaigns to define “police-occupation” as a category protected by human rights laws. Candice Ferrette, Nassau
Lawmakers Pass Bill Targeting Bias Against First Responders, NEWSDAY (Aug. 2, 2021, 10:45
PM), https://www.newsday.com/long-island/politics/nassau-police-discrimination-human-rightslaw-1.50323459.
38. Brendan J. Lyons, Court Rulings Shroud Records, TIMES UNION (Dec. 15, 2016, 4:32
PM), https://www.timesunion.com/tuplus-local/article/Court-rulings-shroud-records10788517.php (“Frank V. Padavan, a former state senator from Queens who was the chief sponsor
of the legislation 40 years ago, confirmed that the sole intention of the statute, which is part of the
state Civil Rights Law, was to stop private attorneys from using subpoenas to gain unfettered
access to the personnel records of police officers. ‘That was the intent,’ said Padavan, 82, who
was a Republican member of the Senate from 1973 to 2010. ‘If the law is being misused, then
obviously an amendment might be in order.’”).
39. Pinto, supra note 35.
40. Pinto, supra note 35 (“On the Senate floor, Padavan seemed unequipped to explain exactly why his bill was necessary, or even what the current procedure for accessing police records
was. ‘Don’t you think it might be important for you to know what the present procedures are in
order to be able to justify the need for this bill?’ Senator Karen Burstein of Nassau County asked
Padavan, according to a Senate transcript, after he was unable to answer her questions about how
records were made public at the time. ‘No,’ Padavan answered. ‘Well, can you tell me what in fact
is the justification of the bill?’ Burstein pressed. ‘I think the bill stands on its own merits,’
Padavan answered. Burstein cut to the chase: Nobody wants to encourage harassment, she said.
‘What this piece of legislation really intends to do is make it so burdensome for anybody with
legitimate interests to get a performance record that, in fact, it will kill such efforts. I suggest in
one particular area that this is important, and that is if you have a charge, and you may have a
number of them, of brutality. It becomes essential to be able to look at somebody’s performance
record.’. . .‘Enactment into law of this bill would be counterproductive to the Governor’s vow to
stamp out corruption in the process of law enforcement, which the Governor characterized as an
intolerable cancer,’ Deputy Attorney General Maurice Nadjari wrote, urging the governor to again
kill the bill. ‘I feel very strongly about this.’”).
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Over the next four decades, legislators expanded 50-a to apply to
firefighters, probation officers, and correction officers.41 At the same time,
prosecutors, police departments, and municipal attorneys successfully urged
courts to expand 50-a to set higher standards for what defenders must show
to access records. This included also applying broader definitions of what
information was covered—for example, extending it to cover agency summaries of records as well as the records themselves.42 Finally in 2016, the
New York Court of Appeals closed off any avenue for accessing police
records (or information about those records) through courts in a case
brought by the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) seeking the trial
memoranda of NYPD’s administrative law judges.43 Based on all these judicial decisions, during the de Blasio administration, the NYPD, municipal
attorneys, and oversight agencies increasingly interpreted 50-a as restricting
access to more and more information.44 During that period of time, the vast
information that the NYPD claimed it was prohibited from disclosing under
50-a also included the names of plainclothes officers who shot a man in
broad daylight, aggregated use of force data, and decades of disciplinary
summaries published by the Deputy Commissioner of Public Information
41. Cynthia H. Conti-Cook, Defending the Public: Police Accountability in the Courtroom,
46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1063, 1068–1070 (2016) (for an in-depth discussion of legislative history
of 50-a).
42. Id. at 1074–75 (“See People v. Cook, 27 N.Y.S.3d 329 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (denying
defense application for CCRB and NYPD records predicated upon civil litigation against subject
officers); People v. Zagaja, No. 227/2015 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Sept. 17, 2015) (denying Gissendanner
application predicated upon prior civil litigation involving named police officer); People v. Barrie,
No. 2014KN003219 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. July 10, 2015) (denying defense application for CCRB and
NYPD records of principal witness); People v. James, 46 Misc. 3d 1219(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015)
(denying defense application for CCRB records); People v. Hernandez, No. 2013KN086748 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. Oct. 22, 2014) (quashing defendant’s subpoena seeking CCRB and any disciplinary
records pertaining to named officer under section 50-a); People v. Rodriguez, 46 Misc. 3d
1220(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (“The fact that federal lawsuits were filed against the officers here
is not a factual predicate warranting review of their personnel files.”); Letter from Brian Krist,
Assistant Deputy Exec. Dir. Of Investigations, CCRB, to Hon. Jaqueline Williams, J. of N.Y.
Fam. Ct. (Jan. 29, 2016) (urging the court to issue a written decision reflecting the court’s decision
from the bench in In re Monge, No. D64/15 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Sept. 29, 2015), wherein the court
denied a motion seeking disclosure of CCRB records). But see People v. Oriol, No. 2744-14 (N.Y.
Crim Ct. 2015) (ordering in camera inspection based upon evidence of settled prior civil litigation.”) (discussing cases listed in this footnote).
43. N.Y. Civ. Liberties v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t, 118 N.E.3d 847, 855 (N.Y. 2018) (Wilson,
J., dissenting) (“By opening the Trial Room proceedings to the public, the City has chosen to
disclose information relevant to that proceeding. In doing so, the City has determined that the
confidentiality of an officer’s identity, the nature of the charged offense, or the evidence supporting that charge—otherwise protected by section 50-a—is of insubstantial weight compared to the
countervailing interest in public disclosure.”) (The Court of Appeals decision did not address
whether NYCLU had a right to access the administrative law decisions under the First Amendment because it was not argued. Judge Wilson’s dissent, while not citing the First Amendment
analysis, argued along similar lines that because the proceedings were public, related documents
used in the proceedings should presumptively be public, as well); Conti-Cook, supra note 24, at
162 (discussing tensions between First Amendment right of access arguments and 50-a).
44. Brad Aaron, De Blasio Gives NYPD an “F” on Transparency, STREETSBLOG NYC (Apr.
23, 2013), https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2013/04/23/de-blasio-gives-nypd-an-f-on-transparency/.
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(DCPI) held in the City archives.45 It was even cited by a NYPD administrative law judge (ALJ) as the basis for closing a courtroom during a disciplinary trial because the administrative prosecutor intended to question the
expert witness, a former officer, about his prior discipline.46 That is how
broadly the NYPD considered 50-a’s scope, above all considerations, police
officers’ (and former officers’) claims to privacy won over accountability
for people’s lives every time, reflecting the type of power Justice Cobb
wrote about in his 1829 decision, “the power of the master must be
absolute.”47
B. The Rise of the 50-a Repeal Coalition
It was also during this time that 50-a’s expansive and prohibitive impact was identified as a significant disruption to families’ ability to hold
police accountable for the loss of their loved ones48 and the public’s ability
to hold individual and institutional actors accountable for the harm they
caused. A broad coalition of community-based organizations, led by the
families who lost loved ones to police violence and organized by the fierce
and strategic vision of the Communities United for Police Reform organizers, knitted organizing, legal, media, and political strategies together
for several years to fight hard for full repeal.49 This required endless strategy sessions, multiple lawsuits, countless City Hall press conferences,
many day-long bus trips to Albany, interviews with reporters, and, of
course, a blunt hashtag. The wonky “#Repeal50a” was the awkward
hashtag that hundreds of tweets, including those from celebrities like
Rihanna, Ariana Grande, and Mariah Carey, used to call upon New York
lawmakers in the days leading up to the law’s repeal.50
45. See Ashley Southall, At James Blake Trial, Judge Invokes Law Shielding Police Records,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/8NKZ-BZPR; Luongo v. Recs. Access Officer, 51
N.Y.S.3d 46, 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (admitting history of public availability at NYPD headquarters and City Hall library); Luongo v. Recs. Access Appeals Officer, 90 N.Y.S.3d 514 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2019) (affirming denial of author’s demand for release of records); Kendall Taggart &
Mike Hayes, Here’s Why BuzzFeed News is Publishing Thousands of Secret NYPD Documents,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 16, 2018, 5:33 AM), https://perma.cc/7S6W-H37U, for a set of these
records that has since been published. These were not the original records of discipline for individual officers, but summaries of police discipline distributed quarterly, including a summary of
the facts, outcome, and penalty. See Rocco Parascandola & Thomas Tracy, Cops Who Killed
Saheed Vassell Identified, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 27, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://perma.cc/BDA44RY6; Jake Offenhartz, ‘Appalling’ Video Shows NYPD Officers Ripping Infant from Brooklyn
Mother’s Arms, GOTHAMIST (Dec. 10, 2018, 8:52 AM), https://perma.cc/TBK9-4B5V; ContiCook, supra note 24, at 150 (discussing the multiple ways 50-a harmed society).
46. See Southall, supra note 45.
47. Allen, supra note 20, (discussing State v. Mann).
48. Sonia Moghe, Disciplinary Record of Ex-Officer Who Held Eric Garner in Chokehold is
Finally Released, CNN (June 23, 2020, 11:01 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/23/us/eric-gar
ner-officer-misconduct-complaints/index.html.
49. Robbins, supra note 5; Wykstra, supra note 5.
50. According to the Social Media Analysis Tool, there were 424 tweets from verified accounts continuing the hashtag between May and June 2020, not including unverified accounts and
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Not long before that imperfect hashtag went viral, legislators were so
cynical about the political viability of a full repeal of 50-a, despite recognizing it was the right thing to do, that its original assembly sponsor did not
introduce it alone but alongside a bill that merely added one word to amend
the original 50-a language—a meaningless amendment in practice, but a
more politically expedient alternative.51 Even after the Democrats took the
State Senate in 2018, repealing 50-a was considered a heavy lift for legislators, and Mayor de Blasio repeatedly undermined advocates’ efforts and
deterred support for full repeal by lobbying for a different amendment to
50-a.52 State Senator Kevin S. Parker, a Brooklyn Democrat, sponsored a
bill in 2017 supported by the mayor and the police department that would
retweets. SMAT Tool, SMAT, https://www.smat-app.com/timeline?searchTerm=repeal50a
&startDate=2014-01-01&endDate=2021-04-07&websites=twitter&aggRedditBy=author&number
Of=10&interval=day&limit=1000&changepoint=false (last visited Sept. 14, 2021); Jameelah
Nasheed, Celebs Like Rihanna and Ariana Grande are Pushing for Repealing 50-a as Part of N.Y.
Police Reform, TEENVOGUE (June 9, 2020), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/celebs-rihanna-ari
ana-grande-repeal-50-a-new-york-police-reform; Jose Martinez, Rihanna, Meek Mill, and More
Sign Letter to Repeal Statute that Blocks Police Misconduct Records in N.Y., COMPLEX (June 8,
2020), https://www.complex.com/life/2020/06/rihanna-meek-mill-migos-more-sign-letter-to-re
peal-new-york-state-statute-50-a.
51. Jeff Coltin & Amanda Luz Henning Santiago, A Guide to 50-a, the Most Contentious
State Law on the Books, CITY AND STATE N.Y. (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.cityandstateny.com/
policy/2019/10/a-guide-to-50-a-the-most-contentious-state-law-on-the-books/177365/ (based on a
recommendation by the Committee on Open Government’s December 2014 Annual Report which
opened with a strong call to repeal 50-a but implicitly acknowledged the political lift that
presented by offering an alternative amendment that added the word “solely” as a qualifier to
narrow the types of records inaccessible to records only used “to evaluate performance toward
continued employment”); For the 2014 Annual Report, see Comm. on Open Gov’t, Annual Report
to the Governor and State Legislature, N.Y. DEP’T OF STATE 2–6 (Dec. 2014), https://perma.cc/
DP9U-WKPN.
52. Coltin & Santiago, supra note 51 (“But advocates like Joo-Hyun Kang, director of Communities United for Police Reform, aren’t convinced that the NYPD wants to see change. The city
has defended the law in court, and Kang hasn’t seen de Blasio or NYPD Commissioner James
O’Neill make a strong lobbying push. The PBA, Kang told City & State, is ‘being aided and
abetted by an administration that’s not interested in transparency but is trying to project an image
that they are.’”); Jake Bittle, The Law that Shields Police Records, Explained, BROOKLYN DAILY
EAGLE (Apr. 23, 2019), https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/2019/04/23/50-a-explained/ (“The success or failure of 50-a reform may hinge on the debate between amending the statute and wiping it
from the state code altogether. One bill introduced in the Senate by the Bronx’s Sen. Jamaal
Bailey and in the Assembly by Manhattan’s Assembly member Danny O’Donnell would repeal
50-a outright. State lawmakers said last week that they had made progress toward passing the bill.
Another bill, introduced by Brooklyn Sen. Kevin Parker, would narrow the 50-a exemption to
cover only records relating to officer performance evaluations and promotions, while a third bill
would keep the law as-is but add a provision allowing civilian review boards to seek the release of
specific records.”); Erin Durkin, De Blasio Does Not Support Full Repeal of Police Secrecy Law,
POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2019, 2:01 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2019/
10/17/de-blasio-does-not-support-full-repeal-of-police-secrecy-law-1225652 (“The NYPD has
used the law to withhold information about complaints against and disciplinary history of police
officers, including Daniel Pantaleo, the officer fired for the death of Eric Garner. De Blasio and
Police Commissioner James O’Neill have called for an overhaul of 50-a to allow the NYPD to
release more information about disciplinary cases. But the mayor does not support the repeal
legislation, a spokeswoman told POLITICO.”).
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have kept 50-a and its fundamental codification of officers’ “right” to privacy for misconduct records intact but “allow[ed] some records to be disclosed once disciplinary proceedings have concluded” in a department’s
discretion, not as an obligation.53 This proposed “discretionary disclosure”
exception to a “privacy” exception to the public access law failed to fundamentally dislodge 50-a as a fabricated privacy protection for police and was
roundly rejected by repeal advocates.54
Reforming, but not repealing, 50-a was the official position of the
mayor and the NYPD, but not everyone in City government. At a Senate
Codes committee hearing in October 2019, CCRB’s Chairman Fred Davie
and Deputy Chief Benjamin Tucker of the NYPD were both scheduled to
testify until Davie revealed he intended to support full repeal of 50-a in a
tweet the weekend prior.55 De Blasio barred officials from both NYPD and
CCRB from testifying “so they wouldn’t clash in public.”56 Davie presented
his testimony with the NYPD one week later, clarifying that he was testifying about his “personal belief” and not the city agency he was chair of the
board for.57 In addition to Davie, other government officials’ statements
supporting full repeal were included as testimony during the October 2019
hearings, including the City of Kingston’s mayor. He wrote,
[t]he City of Kingston has been working to improve police/community relations for well over a decade and we have taken new
steps to establish and strengthen open and transparent policies and
procedures. In this work, I have experienced the barriers to making information related to members of our police department
available to the public.58
In addition to the families and organizations in the CPR coalition,
groups that submitted testimony in support of full repeal in October 2019
included the Reporters’ Committee for Freedom of the Press, New York
News Publishers Association, and good government groups like Common
53. Ashley Southall, 4 Years After Eric Garner’s Death, Secrecy Law on Police Discipline
Remains Unchanged, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/03/nyregion/
police-discipline-records-garner.html.
54. MARIA CILENTI & ELIZABETH KOCIENDA, REPORT ON LEGIS. BY THE CIVIL RIGHTS
COMM.; CRIM. COURTS COMM.; COMMUNICATIONS & MEDIA LAW COMM. (note, author was one of
the original drafters of this report).
55. Craig McCarthy, CCRB Chair Publicly Voices Support for Full Repeal of NYPD Personnel Files Law, N.Y. POST (Oct. 19, 2019, 9:45 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/10/19/ccrb-chairpublicly-voices-support-for-full-repeal-of-nypd-personnel-files-law/.
56. Craig McCarthy, Bernadette Hogan & Bruce Golding, De Blasio Muzzled NYPD, CCRB
from Testifying on Planned Repeal of Records Law, N.Y. POST (Oct. 17, 2019, 9:42 PM), https://
nypost.com/2019/10/17/de-blasio-muzzled-nypd-ccrb-from-testifying-on-planned-repeal-ofrecords-law/.
57. Fred Davie (@RevFredDavie), TWITTER (Oct. 19, 2019, 8:11 AM), https://twitter.com/
RevFredDavie/status/1185543980991287297; McCarthy, supra note 55.
58. Steven Noble, Letter from Steven T. Noble, Mayor of the City of Kingston, to Assemb.
Cahill and Sen. Amedore, in N.Y.S. STANDING COMM. ON CODES HEARING ON CRL §50-A 12
(2019).
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Cause.59 NYPD’s testimony at that hearing continued to oppose full
repeal.60
C. “Protest Works”: #Repeal50-a and the Protests Following George
Floyd’s Murder
Up until days before protesters’ demands fueled 50-a to rocket towards
repeal, de Blasio continued to push for “reform” and not repeal of 50-a.61
He only “joined the anti-50-a bandwagon” days before lawmakers repealed
it.62 “Protest works,” wrote Mara Gay in the New York Times Opinion column. Counting the number of places she saw “Repeal 50-a” written and
chanted in late May, and early June: “[I]t was startling in the past week to
see “Repeal 50-a” signs pop up across New York State, at the protests and
elsewhere.” She recalled, “one car emblazoned with the phrase in electrical
tape” and “Repeal 50-a!” posted in the upscale Cobble Hill, Brooklyn
storefront of a local doctor’s office and in brownstone windows. “What
changed is that people took to the streets in peaceful protest, a movement
led by Black New Yorkers and others who have fought for reforms for
years.”63 What was clear to New Yorkers following George Floyd’s death
at the hands of Derek Chauvin, whose record of twenty-two prior complaints was reported on immediately following Floyd’s death, was that if
the same thing happened in New York, that history would have hidden behind 50-a.64 A lead organizer with the advocacy group Make the Road New
59. Coltin & Santiago, supra note 51; Katie Townsend, Letter from Katie Townsend to
Jamaal T. Bailey, in N.Y.S. STANDING COMM. ON CODES HEARING ON CRL §50-A 31 (2019);
Diane Kennedy, Testimony of Diane Kennedy, in N.Y.S. STANDING COMM. ON CODES HEARING
ON CRL §50-A 59 (2019); COMMON CAUSE/NY, Testimony of COMMONCAUSE/NY, in
N.Y.S. STANDING COMM. ON CODES HEARING ON CRL §50-A 76 (2019).
60. Oleg Chernyavsky, Statement of Oleg Chernyavsky, in N.Y.S. STANDING COMM. ON
CODES HEARING ON CRL §50 42 (2019).
61. Shant Shahrigian, Mayor De Blasio Hops on Anti-‘50-a’ Bandwagon Following Repeal
in Albany, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 10, 2020, 7:16 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/
politics/ny-nypd-50a-bill-de-blasio-20200610-45cfj4m6sfgxzov5y5dsutkffe-story.html (“As recently as Sunday, he called for ‘reforming’ 50-a instead of repealing it outright. And in 2017, his
administration successfully blocked lawsuits demanding the release of police disciplinary records,
on grounds they were protected under the 50-a law.”).
62. Id.
63. Mara Gay, Good Riddance to One of America’s Strongest Police Secrecy Laws, N.Y.
TIMES (June 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/opinion/repeal-50a-ny-police.html.
64. Olivia Rubin & Luke Barr, Amid Protests, Effort to Repeal Controversial Police Law
Makes Headway, ABC NEWS (June 5, 2020, 1:15 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/amid-protestseffort-repeal-controversial-police-law-makes/story?id=71089266 (“‘[50-a] is an iron curtain in
front of police that are abusive,’ said Monifa Bandele, a spokesperson for Communities United for
Police Reform (CUPR), an organization that has been working to repeal 50-a in New York for
four years. She pointed out that Derek Chauvin, the police officer accused of murdering George
Floyd in Minneapolis, had 17 prior complaints in his record—a critical piece of information that
she said would not have been publicly available in New York.”); Paul Wolf, Time to Repeal 50-a,
THE RIVERDALE PRESS (June 14, 2020), https://riverdalepress.com/stories/time-to-repeal-50a,72023 (“In Minnesota — unlike New York — police disciplinary records are accessible to the
public. And through this transparency, the public was able to learn that the officer responsible for
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York, Adilka Pimental, described Black and brown New Yorkers’ groundswell of support for 50-a repeal coming from the knowledge that communities in New York City were also witnessing frequent police violence.
Unlike the community that watched Derek Chauvin kill George Floyd, New
Yorkers “[were] unable to look at patterns of officers who are continuously
beating people up in the community.”65
It is not radical to expect public access to information about government misconduct in a democracy; it should “easily yield” to the public’s
right to know, and yet, looking at what it took for New Yorkers to repeal
50-a, one might actually believe it was radical.66 Police unions, police departments, municipal lawyers, prosecutors, and courts all believed in, advocated for, and expanded secrecy for police misconduct in the four decades
50-a was law. The law did not change during that time because many
elected officials feared the police unions’ coffers and bullying more than
the public’s demand for transparency. No one thought a concept like transparency, labeled “obscure” by some, would electrify public protest.67 What
New Yorkers achieved in repealing 50-a was taking a first step towards
rebalancing the power between police and communities through their own
kind of collective bargaining—enduring, energetic, and democratic protest.

Mr. Floyd’s death was the subject of 18 police conduct complaints.”); Rebecca Brown & Cynthia
Conti-Cook, Crime Without Punishment, 46 HUM. RTS. MAG. (Jan. 11, 2020); Jamiles Lartey &
Abbie Vansickle, ‘Don’t Kill Me’: Others Tell of Abuse by Officer Who Knelt on George Floyd,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/02/us/derek-chauvin-george-floydpast-cases.html (noting Chauvin had a previous 22 complaints).
65. Wykstra, supra note 5; Gina Bellafante, Why Secrecy Laws Protecting Bad Officers Are
Falling, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/05/nyregion/policerecords-50a.html; Jason Newman, N.Y. S. Votes to Overturn 44-Year-Old Law Shielding Police
Disciplinary Records, ROLLING STONE (June 9, 2020, 4:47 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/
politics/politics-news/new-york-senate-50-a-police-misconduct-1012357/; Robbins, supra note 5;
Theo Wilson, New York’s Courts Have Broken 50-a, Now the Legislature Must Immediately Repeal It, JURIST (June 6, 2020, 8:50 PM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/06/theo-wilsonsection50a-officer-misconduct/ (“But had Mr. Floyd’s murder been committed by law enforcement officers in New York State, not only would those officers’ disciplinary record have been
withheld, but the police department would have had legal justification to withhold other crucial
details about the incident, thanks to Section 50-A of New York State’s Civil Rights Law. In fact,
in New York State, a police department could even legally withhold the officers’ names.”)
66. Allen, supra note 20 (emphasis added).
67. Jon Campbell & Beryl Lipton, N.Y. 50-a repeal: Six Months Later, Police Find Ways to
Shield Disciplinary Records, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Dec. 22, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://
www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/politics/albany/2020/12/22/new-york-state-50-a-re
peal-six-months-later-police-shielding-public-records/3964062001/ (calling 50-a “once obscure”);
Peterson DelleCave LLP, NYPD Police Disciplinary Records Remain Confidential Due to Little
Known Statute – Section 50-a N.Y. State Civil Rights Law, PETERSON DELLECAVE LLP, https://
www.nycpolicemisconductlawyers.com/nypd-police-disciplinary-records-remain-confidentialdue-to-litt.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2021) (calling 50-a “little known”).
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50-A’S REPEAL

In the year following 50-a’s repeal, its impact, and the value of public
access to police misconduct information has been undeniable.68 And only a
very limited amount of data has been made available—one very limited
dataset last summer (ProPublica dataset) and the information available from
CCRB and NYPD databases (official databases), plus whatever information
reporters have received directly in response to their open records requests.
While this does not mean that transparency has cured police violence, this
section will present a proof of concept for the project of fighting for robust
public access to police misconduct records. By counting the many ways
different stakeholders have already used police misconduct data since its
release (despite implementation failures at various departments and delays
caused by unions’ lawsuits), this section explores how the data has impacted conversations about police violence, police accountability, justice,
and public safety.69
The discussion of impact is organized according to the proximity of
the humans most effected by the availability of the data. First, this section
will discuss how families directly impacted by police violence and the communities historically oppressed by police violence have explored and used
the data. Next, this section contemplates how police officers themselves
have used databases to protect themselves and fight discrimination in disciplinary systems.70 Then, this section moves into the stakeholders in the
criminal legal system to understand how access to police misconduct data
68. To the contrary of some skeptics’ positions. Wykstra, supra note 5 (“[Prof. Kate Levine]
is skeptical about the degree to which public disclosure of the misconduct records will help bring
accountability. ‘I have not seen any evidence that having these records be public leads to a less
brutal police force,’ Levine said. While it’s possible that the public records would allow people to
hold officers accountable, she says there isn’t a clear reason to think that making the records
public would make much of a difference.”).
69. It is worth a deeper dive and a separate article about all the attempts at obstructing access
to records, even after 50-a’s repeal, i.e., charging thousands of dollars, claiming repeal only applies retroactively, claiming repeal only applies going forward, claiming the scope of disclosure is
narrowly limited to substantiated records, etc., so that future legislators can make their new law
clear about the expectations of transparency, codify what is not going to be an excuse, and set
sanctions and scrutiny for departments that fail to comply and unnecessarily force litigation. In
addition, legislators could require departments to make electronic versions of data available that
are complete, uniform, and downloadable. See Craig Campbell, N.Y. City Open Data: A Brief
History, DATA-SMART CITY SOLUTIONS (Mar. 8, 2017), https://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/
article/new-york-city-open-data-a-brief-history-991 (for the history of the open data law in New
York City, which has thus far not included police misconduct data beyond aggregate numbers);
CITY OF N.Y. DEP’T OF INFO. TECH. AND TELECOMM., OPEN DATA POLICY AND TECHNICAL STANDARD MANUAL (2018) (how NYC sets standards for other agencies’ datasets).
70. Sheryl L. Walter, Erik Gonzalez-Mul’e, Cristiano L. Guarana, Ernest H. O’Boyle Jr.,
Christopher M. Berry & Timothy T. Baldwin, The Race Discipline Gap: A Cautionary Note on
Archival Measures of Behavioral Misconduct, 1 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 1–13 (2020) (finding Black officers were more likely to receive formal discipline
during their tenure) (h/t Rajiv & Sukari) (contrast with Kate Levine’s conclusions that the public
would not be able to decipher discriminatory impact on disciplinary data).
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has facilitated some prosecutors’ and defense attorneys’ understanding of
the legitimacy of allegations an officer has accused someone of, and in
some cases, also facilitated a retroactive review of an officer’s history of
convictions and, in other states, even a few mass exonerations.71 The next
section moves to a review of the investigative journalism that has arisen
from access to this data to demonstrate the depth of reporting now happening around particular types of police misconduct, certain squads, and systemic reforms focused on the ultimate power of the NYPD commissioner to
issue discipline. Finally, we consider the potential contributions this data
will have towards informing historical review of policing in New York and
an emerging debate about the future role of policing in community safety.
A. Impact of 50-a Repeal on People Harmed by Police and Their
Families and Communities
Secrecy from 50-a has had the additional effect of traumatizing families who lost loved ones by concealing information about the involved officers. Constance Malcolm, mother of Ramarley Graham, killed by police in
2012, described that experience as common for family members:
When [she] spoke to other relatives of victims of police violence,
she learned that they, too, had been blocked from seeing officer
records because of 50-A. “All the mothers and families I met afterward, they hit the same brick wall,” Malcolm said. “It was the
same thing over and over, the same stumbling block, this 50-A.
We couldn’t get information unless it was leaked.”72
Gwen Carr, the mother of Eric Garner, said following the repeal of 50a, “‘I’m so glad for the transparency,’ . . . ‘I just think going forward we
shouldn’t have to fight and wait five years to get the disciplinary records of
the police officers who recklessly kill.’”73 Families may hit new brick
walls, certainly, but a statutory privacy law that prioritizes police officers’
reputations will not be one of them. They will not be told police privacy
outweighs their right to know what contributed to their loved ones’ deaths.
The communities where these incidents occur will also no longer be
fearful of not knowing, for example, the names of police who shot a man in
71. Ronald Watts, Mass Exoneration Milestone: Judge Tosses More Convictions in Chi. Cop
Scandal, NBC CHI. (Dec. 15, 2020, 7:33 PM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/mass-exoneration-milestone-for-cook-county/2395486/; Sophia Chang, Brooklyn DA Seeks to Vacate 90
Convictions Based on Work of NYPD Detective Accused of Perjury, GOTHAMIST (Apr. 7, 2021,
4:43 PM), https://gothamist.com/news/brooklyn-da-seeks-vacate-90-convictions-based-worknypd-detective-accused-perjury; Chris Palmer, Philly Man on Death Row 23 Years for Killing 4year-old Northeast Girl is ‘Likely Innocent,’ DA Larry Krasner Says, THE PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar.
3, 2020), https://www.inquirer.com/news/walter-ogrod-death-row-larry-krasner-philadelphia-dalikely-innocent-exoneration-20200303.html.
72. Robbins, supra note 5.
73. Sonia Moghe, Disciplinary Record of Ex-Officer Who Held Eric Garner in Chokehold is
Finally Released, CNN (June 23, 2020, 11:01 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/23/us/eric-garner-officer-misconduct-complaints/index.html.
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broad daylight and how the department responded (or failed to respond).74
In the few months that the NYPD and CCRB’s databases have been live, it
is hard to know exactly how many people in the city and around the world
have accessed the data or what they have used it for. Maybe they got pulled
over and suspected being racially profiled. Maybe they want to know who
they are assigned to work with that night. Maybe they witnessed or experienced brutality and are trying to figure out what remedies they want to seek
on behalf of themselves and their community. We do know that people are
accessing this data, for whatever reason. As of April 29, 2021, a little more
than a month after it went live on March 4, CCRB reports that there have
been 86,878 page visits and 141,698 views of its database.75 Their Freedom
of Information Law (FOIL) requests since June 2020 have also steadily
increased.76 In addition to accessing the databases to do quick name
searches, the public is also engaged in working with the data and building
tools to understand it.
An inspired software engineer77 released a searchable database in August 2020 using the data obtained from the CCRB by ProPublica.78 Unlike
the CCRB or NYPD databases, this website presents a visualization of the
complaints mapped onto New York City for a small universe of complaints,
as specified on the website: “ProPublica obtained these records from the
Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB). It’s important to note that this
data only includes closed cases of officers that are still on the force, and had
at least one substantiated allegation against them.” Nonetheless, it is a
model for the potential that this data holds.
Other community-based groups are also curating and presenting this
data. CopWatch.Media “is a community-based project that publishes articles and videos about law enforcement’s effects on hyper-policed Black,
Latinx and non-white communities. [It also] will host a database that catalogues police and police misconduct.”79 Brooklyn-based organization El
Grito, with help from Witness, also compiled Officer Profiles to address
repeated aggressions by specific officers in their neighborhood of Sunset
Park. “In the absence of a comprehensive database about NYPD police mis74. Nayaba Arinde, Saheed Vassell Shooting: Name Killer Cops, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS
(Apr. 19, 2018, 12:00 AM), http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2018/apr/19/saheed-vassell-shoot
ing-cops/.
75. James D. Walsh, The City Just Released a Massive NYPD-Misconduct Database, INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 4, 2021), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/03/the-city-just-published-a-mas
sive-nypd-misconduct-database.html.
76. Email response on file with the author. A user can visit the page once but view it multiple
times. If someone navigates to the page, leaves it, then comes back, that is one visit and two
views.
77. SUNNY NG, https://sunny.ng/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2021).
78. Sunny Ng, Visualizing the ProPublica NYPD Files, MEDIUM (Aug. 11, 2020), https://
medium.com/@_blahblahblah/visualizing-the-propublica-nypd-files-41c0ccc8a156. The database
is available at Sunny Ng, NYPD COMPLAINTS, https://www.nypdcomplaints.com/.
79. COPWATCH.MEDIA, https://copwatch.media/about/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2021).
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conduct, this project explores how civic video and open-source data can
corroborate incidents of abuse and develop narratives that go beyond a single video.”80 El Grito notes that their Officer Profiles have “played an important role in investigations, media reports and getting wrongful charges
dropped for some victims.”81
In addition to a blossoming of community-led databases, organizations
that work on police reform have been able to analyze the data to substantiate advocacy campaigns previously driven by anecdotes and aggregate data.
Policy advocacy organization Girls for Gender Equity (GGE), for example,
using the first round of data released by the CCRB last summer, issued a
report called Overlooked in Plain Sight: Documenting Police Violence
Against Girls of Color.82 Again, their analysis was based on the limited
ProPublica dataset confined to “closed cases of every active-duty NYPD
police officer who has at least one substantiated misconduct allegation
against them,” but they nevertheless found “1,083 cases where the complainant was a girl or young woman aged 24 and under, spanning from
1999 to 2019.”83 GGE used the data “to shift the public consciousness
around the everyday violence of policing, particularly framing policing as a
kind of concentrated gender-based violence.”84 They highlighted serious
disparities across race and age, analyzed the complaints based on type of
misconduct, and were able to target at least one incident which, if treated
more seriously initially, may have prevented harm to another woman.
In one substantiated case of a 14-year-old Black girl in Canarsie reporting offensive language by gender, the outcome for the 42-year-old officer, who at that time had thirteen years on the job, was “formalized
training.” The incident also included a complaint of physical force that was
closed as unsubstantiated. One year after the case was closed, the officer
was named in the Daily News following his own arrest for assaulting a
woman identified as his girlfriend.85 Overlooked in Plain Sight is a stellar
demonstration of an organization using police misconduct data to support
what its members have been telling the public for years.
B. Impact of 50-a Repeal on Police Officers
Contrary to public perception, police have also used independent misconduct databases to access data about their peers, armed with guns and
badges, with whom they work closely but do not always know well. Exper80. Recording Abuses: Officer Profiles, EL GRITO, https://elgrito.witness.org/officer-profiles/
(last visited Oct. 2, 2021).
81. Id.
82. GIRLS FOR GENDER EQUITY, OVERLOOKED IN PLAIN SIGHT: DOCUMENTING POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST GIRLS OF COLOR 1 (July 2020), https://www.ggenyc.org/wp-content/uploads/
2020/07/Overlooked-in-Plain-Sight_A-GGE-Report.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2.
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iencing police violence can also traumatize some police officers, although
in significantly different ways.86
An anonymous officer, “Officer A. Cab,” blogged about their experiences of misconduct as a police officer, generally without any discipline or
repercussions, ranging from brutality to lying to abuse of authority.87 This
officer described writing up fellow officers as a rookie until “the academy
staff read my complaints to [my fellow officers] out loud and outed me to
them and never punished them, causing me to get harassed for the rest of
my academy class. That’s how I learned that even police leadership hates
rats.”88 Police officers are often aware that their departments have intentionally ignored reports of violence, crime, and corruption by the officers
they may be partnering with on any given shift. Access to disciplinary information also gives officers insight into decisions that impact them.
Likewise, many officers do not trust the internal disciplinary system
not to repeat the same patterns of discrimination as the criminal legal system. Research based on the data obtained in Chicago found racial discrimination against Black officers in the police disciplinary system,
demonstrating its value not just for protecting the rights and safety of members of the public, but for substantiating experiences of injustice police officers experience too.89
C. Impact of 50-a Repeal on Actors in the Legal System
Police are not the only unlikely actors to benefit from access to police
misconduct data; prosecutors have also been able to investigate the credibility of the officers from the moment they walk a person accused of a crime
into court, exonerate people whose accusers were later found to commit
perjury, and verify the accuracy of officers’ claims of having clean records
in job applications to new departments.90 The repeal of 50-a was cited as
86. TERNARIAN A. WARREN, THE EFFECTS OF FREQUENT EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE AND
TRAUMA ON POLICE OFFICERS 102 (Walden Univ. 2015).
87. Officer A. Cab, Confessions of a Former Bastard Cop, MEDIUM (June 6, 2020), https://
medium.com/@OfcrACab/confessions-of-a-former-bastard-cop-bb14d17bc759.
88. Id.
89. Walter, Gonzalez-Mul’e, Guarana, O’Boyle Jr., Berry & Baldwin, supra note 70 (finding
Black officers were more likely to receive formal discipline during their tenure) (h/t Rajiv and
Sukari). Contra Wykstra, supra note 5 (Kate Levine concluding that the public would not be able
to decipher discriminatory impact on disciplinary data).
90. Peter Crowley, Cop Charged With False Info on Job Application; 50-A Repeal Let DA
Get Disciplinary Records, OBSERVER-DISPATCH (Nov. 20, 2020, 8:52 AM), https://
www.uticaod.com/story/news/2020/11/20/cop-charged-false-info-job-application-50-repeal-letda-get-disciplinary-records/6353969002/ (“The alleged deception might never have been found if
the state Legislature had not repealed a section of civil law known as 50-a, which shielded police
officers’ personnel records from public view”); see also Peter Crowley, SL Cop Charged With
False Job Application: 50-a Repeal Let DA Get Disciplinary Records From Massena,
ADIRONDACK DAILY ENTER. (Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.adirondackdailyenterprise.com/news/
local-news/2020/11/sl-cop-charged-with-false-job-application/. While it is not clearly reported on,
these reports imply that the significance of this officer’s misconduct being unearthed is not for the
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the reason one upstate New York prosecutor was able to discover an officer’s prior history of misconduct at another police department that he
failed to report in his job application at his current department and end his
petition for a potentially violent canine unit.91 Prior to 50-a’s repeal, New
York City prosecutors lamented their reliance on the NYPD to access misconduct records and openly demanded more streamlined access.92 In an
open letter to the NYPD in 2018, Cy Vance’s office explained that the misconduct information was needed “to make early assessments of witness
credibility, explore weaknesses in a potential case and exonerate individuals
who may have been mistakenly accused.”93 Now prosecutors do not have
any justification to not access information about police misconduct and
build reviews of officer credibility into their early case assessments or to
initiate mass exonerations of people when pervasive police misconduct may
have contributed to their wrongful convictions.94 In addition, New York
City prosecutors have, in response to open records requests by Gothamist/
WNYC reporter George Joseph, disclosed additional police misconduct that
their offices have documented during the course of criminal case investigations.95 These disclosures, while certainly not volunteered by prosecutors,
open opportunities for deeper engagement about fairness, justice, public
safety, and policing between the people and the district attorneys.96
Public defenders and criminal defense attorneys in general will be able
to more effectively protect their clients from the brutality of imprisonment
and other carceral punishments. Defenders will be able to better develop
sake of his veracity alone but because the consequence of not investigating his past may have
allowed him to persuade his current police department to let him build a canine unit with a dog
that had previously harmed someone at a prior department.
91. Crowley, Cop Charged With False Info on Job Application, supra note 90; Crowley, SL
Cop Charged With False Job Application, supra note 90.
92. James C. McKinley Jr., Manhattan District Attorney Demands Access to Police Records,
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/nyregion/manhattan-district-at
torney-police-records.html (“Not only has Mr. Vance asked the New York Police Department to
give his office electronic access to officers’ disciplinary records, but he has also demanded a
searchable database of investigative reports for Manhattan crimes, including detectives’ memos on
evidence and statements by witnesses and victims.”).
93. Id. (quoting Mike Hayes & Kendall Taggart, The District Attorney Says The NYPD Isn’t
Telling Prosecutors Which Cops Have A History Of Lying, BUZZFEED NEWS (June 2, 2018), https:/
/www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mikehayes/nypd-cops-lying-discipline-disrict-attorneysprosecutors#.wszRzyGnq).
94. See Kristine Phillips, Police Misconduct, Such as Falsifying Evidence, is a Leading
Cause of Wrongful Convictions, Study Finds, USA TODAY (Sept. 15, 2020) https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/09/15/police-misconduct-among-leading-causesfalse-convictions/5795715002/.
95. George Joseph & Sydney Pereira, Staten Island DA Releases Thousands of Records Documenting NYPD Misconduct and Dishonesty, GOTHAMIST (Aug. 24, 2020, 6:36 PM), https://
gothamist.com/news/staten-island-da-releases-thousands-records-documenting-nypd-misconductand-dishonesty.
96. See MEASURES FOR JUSTICE, https://measuresforjustice.org/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2021)
(seeking to use data to facilitate conversations about policing and public safety between members
of the public and their local District Attorneys).
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their investigation, counsel clients, and prepare for trial.97 They will not be
subject to prosecutors gatekeeping information about impeachment evidence98 and can build their own databases of misconduct information that
include both publicly reported misconduct (news articles, criminal court decisions, federal lawsuits, notices of claim, etc.) and government misconduct
records (from NYPD and oversight agencies).99 The National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers started the Full Disclosure Project, led by
Julie Ciccolini, the creator and technical lead of The Legal Aid Society of
New York City’s Cop Accountability Project database for defenders, to
help defenders do exactly that.100 Defenders will also be able to help push
prosecutors and courts for mass exonerations in cases where officers were
found to have perjured themselves,101 as well as use this data to develop
factual support for courts employing the exclusionary rule as a remedy for
suppression.102 Civil rights lawyers and impact litigation organizations will
also rely on this data to factually develop allegations of municipal liability
that, for example, the departments’ disciplinary system caused a recurring
pattern of constitutional violations by failing to discipline officers for
chokeholds.103
D. Impact of 50-a Repeal on the Media
Access to police misconduct data over the past year has deepened the
investigative journalism and reporting into police misconduct, policing, police accountability, and public safety since the repeal of 50-a. Weeks after
the repeal of 50-a, the New York Times reported on a NYPD officer, David
Afanador, who was the first officer to be criminally accused of using a
chokehold under new city and state laws.104 For the first time since 50-a’s
repeal, the article included not only data about the officer’s history of misconduct and the outcomes of prior complaints (including a prior
97. Cynthia H. Conti-Cook, Defending the Public Police Accountability in the Courtroom, 46
SETON HALL L. REV. 1063, 1085 (2016); see also Beryl Lipton, The Repeal of New York’s 50-a
Could be a Boon to Defense Attorneys, MUCKROCK (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.muckrock.com/
news/archives/2020/dec/15/50-a-repeal-a-boon-to-defense-attorneys/.
98. Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files and
the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 743 (2015).
99. Alice Speri, Open Data Projects Are Fueling the Fight Against Police Misconduct, THE
INTERCEPT (Oct. 25, 2016, 7:31 AM), https://theintercept.com/2016/10/25/open-data-projects-arefueling-the-fight-against-police-misconduct/.
100. The Full Disclosure Project, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAW., https://www.nacdl.org/
Landing/FullDisclosureProject (last visited Oct. 2, 2021).
101. Phillips, supra note 94.
102. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Exclusionary Rule in the Age of Blue Data, 72 VAND. L.
REV. 561, 576–80 (2019).
103. Complaint at ¶ 31, Medina v. City of N.Y., 19 Civ. 9412 (2019).
104. Ashley Southall, N.Y.P.D. Officer Charged with Using Illegal Chokehold, N.Y. TIMES
(June 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/nyregion/nypd-officer-chokeholdarrest
.html (first article putting officer’s current misconduct in context with other internal records following 50-a repeal).
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chokehold), it also included data about the outcomes and penalties of similar cases.105 Imagine a story about an officer’s arrest for a use of force not
having the context of either the officer’s history or the department’s track
record of discipline for chokeholds. The story would perhaps only be about
whether it happened or not, possibly an interview with a witness or a lawyer
or the PBA, or nothing would be published at all. The inclusion of the prior
misconduct information makes the story about something more than “a bad
apple” or a rogue officer; it asks a much deeper question about whether the
NYPD’s failures contributed to causing harm, rather than a rogue officer. It
asks whether there will be accountability beyond that officer’s criminal
charges for the department’s multiple failures that contributed to the harm
caused by an officer.
It is worth digging a little deeper into just how institutionally responsible the NYPD is for officers’ continued uses of chokeholds to underscore
the relevance of Afanador’s history of misconduct information—particularly the prior chokehold complaint.106 The NYPD has historically failed to
discipline officers for chokeholds specifically. In a lawsuit the Legal Aid
Society filed against the NYPD, NYPD Detective Fabio Nunez, and several
others in 2019, allegations included a claim that the NYPD was responsible
for Nunez’s use of a chokehold because he had previously used one without
disciplinary consequence, as had Afanador and many other officers, despite
a Patrol Guide rule from 1985 that prohibited it.107 The lawsuit documented
the many ways that the department’s failure to discipline sent officers like
Afanador and Nunez the message that there would not be consequences for
using it. Pointing to a CCRB report, “A Mutated Rule: Lack of Enforcement in the Face of Persistent Chokehold Complaints in New York City,”
the lawsuit could even allege that the NYPD knew the role their disciplinary system played in their failure to enforce the Patrol Guide’s prohibition
on chokeholds in 2014 and failed to take remedial action then, despite all
the rhetoric about learning from Eric Garner’s tragic chokehold death that
same year.
The problem the CCRB identified with chokeholds is worth explaining
because it also implicates 50-a’s harm on the public’s ability to hold the
government accountable: the 2014 report identified a series of decisions by
NYPD administrative trial judges—unavailable under 50-a and not discussed in detail by the CCRB in its report for that reason—that were interpreting the prohibition on chokeholds not as a blanket prohibition but as a
105. Id.
106. To the author’s knowledge, the NYPD has not made any changes that would impact how
this definition of chokehold is interpreted. See Topher Sanders & Yoav Gonen, Still Can’t
Breathe, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 21, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/chokeholdsnypd-videos (providing the latest in-depth coverage of how chokeholds are punished by the
NYPD).
107. Complaint, supra note 103, at 7–11 (settling in 2021 for money and Nunez resigning)
(author was lead counsel on the drafting of the complaint).
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narrower regulation that only prohibited “actual and sustained interference
with breathing.”108 These decisions effectively acted like common law for
the NYPD’s trial department, meaning that judges used them to interpret
Patrol Guide rules and prosecutors would decline to bring charges if the
restriction to breathing was not “actual” or “sustained” interference. Even
NYPD Internal Affairs may have followed this narrower rule set by administrative judges when exonerating officers accused of using chokeholds.109
Meaning that over the decades that chokeholds were prohibited, officers
were using them against New Yorkers if no one could prove that they
caused “actual and sustained interference with breathing,” and complaints
about them were not substantiated.
As a result of decades of NYPD administrative trial judges, administrators, and City investigators eroding the prohibition on chokeholds,
“NYPD officers, across all five boroughs and from a range of ranks and
commands, have been accused of using chokeholds in at least forty federal
civil rights lawsuits filed between January 2015 and June 2018. The City
settled at least thirty of these lawsuits involving the use of chokeholds by
NYPD officers for at least $1,236,502.”110 Citing the CCRB’s Data Transparency Initiative, the lawsuit alleged that “the agency received 1,811
chokehold allegations from January 2009 to December 2018. From these
public reports, the NYPD is on notice that an average of 181 chokeholds
have been reported per year—an average of 15 chokehold allegations per
month, or one chokehold allegation every two days—over the past ten
years.” Much more so than any individual officer, Mayor de Blasio, NYPD
leadership, risk management, legal, policy, and supervisory staff are all
guilty of every chokehold an officer has used since 2014.
So when the New York Times includes past information that contextualizes a specific officer’s current allegation of a chokehold with data from a
prior allegation for a chokehold, the value of that data is not just for its
“propensity” evidence—that if he did it before, he would do it again.111 It is
valuable because it reveals how the city department’s failure to hold officers accountable for misconduct encourages future misconduct by those
officers and those surrounding them.112 An in-depth review of Chauvin’s
prior misconduct also revealed multiple chokeholds and the Minneapolis
108. NYC CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD, A MUTATED RULE: LACK OF ENFORCEMENT
FACE OF PERSISTENT CHOKEHOLD COMPLAINTS IN NEW YORK CITY viii (2014).
109. See id.
110. Complaint, supra note 103, at ¶ 31.
111. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
112. See KYLE ROZEMA & MAX SCHANZENBACH, DOES DISCIPLINE DECREASE POLICE MISCONDUCT? EVIDENCE FROM CHICAGO CIVILIAN ALLEGATIONS (2021) (“We assess police officer
response to administrative determinations of misconduct. Using Chicago data, we find strong evidence that a sustained allegation reduces that officer’s future misconduct. We find no evidence
that this effect is driven by incapacitation, such as assignment to desk duty, or by officer disengagement [with policing]. We conclude that our findings are . . . consistent with improved officer
conduct, in part [due to] . . . officer concerns over promotion, salary, and desirable assignments”).
IN THE
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Police Department’s failure to hold him accountable.113 It justifies serious
scrutiny into whether the NYPD is capable of policing itself and protecting
New Yorkers from violence at the hands of its own members, let alone
other people. It also begs the question to what extent police contribute to
New Yorkers’ feeling unsafe in the presence of police rather than protected.
It facilitates a framing of the problem at hand to be not one of a single
individual’s brutality about which we can collectively do nothing but punish that person, as opposed to a common problem that might have a solution
if we contribute our perspectives and experiences to collectively inform it
through a public education, debate, and voting. To quote the visionary Ida
B. Wells again, “[i]n a multitude of counsel there is wisdom.”114
The NYPD therefore played a significant role in causing Afanador and
Nunez, and probably many other officers, to believe that using this type of
force would not be punished. Their prior experience going through the disciplinary system unscathed confirmed this. The message to police was that
if you used a chokehold, there might be an investigation, but it would not be
substantiated and therefore would not be on your record. And as long as 50a was the law, no one, including the defense counsel of people you accuse
of crimes in the future, would ever know. Your future supervisors, employers, and partners would all never know—not to mention the people in officers’ private lives that hold them accountable to morals and values more
demanding than their police peers or even the law.115
The message was that the officer would not be held accountable, and
neither would the NYPD for failing to hold the officer accountable. Without
misconduct data to identify patterns with, the message from the NYPD to
officers like Afanador and Nunez could be that high profile incidents happen, but they would be aggressively defended with a weaponized counter
narrative of law and order, an attack on the reputation of the person they
harmed, and a burial of similar past misconduct with 50-a to mollify any
calls for reform.116 Transparency is the shovel we dig this information up
with to reveal the potential for official—not just individual—
accountability.117
113. Jamiles Lartey & Abbie VanSickle, ‘Don’t Kill Me’: Others Tell of Abuse by Officer
Who Knelt on George Floyd, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/02/
us/derek-chauvin-george-floyd-past-cases.html.
114. Wells, supra note 34.
115. Allen, supra note 30.
116. Joe Borelli, Chaim Deutsch & Paul Vallone, ‘Right to Know’ Will Handcuff Our Cops,
N. Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/handcuff-cops-article1.3702077.
117. Kate Levine, Police Prosecutions and Punitive Instincts, 98 WASH. L. REV. 997,
1056–1057 (2021). See Conclusion, infra for how this common problem-solving system should be
adopted to a public safety system generally to reduce the reliance and over expenditure of public
funding on police as the only publicly funded solution to crime and the conditions that cause it.

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\18-1\UST103.txt

70

unknown

Seq: 28

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

19-APR-22

12:37

[Vol. 18:1

Another significant example of how local reporting on police improved as a result of 50-a’s repeal was the reporting about a warrant squad
filmed grabbing a protester during the summer of 2020.118 The squad’s
prior misconduct available at that time—the same limited dataset ProPublica published from the CCRB in the summer of 2020—showed that its
misconduct history was second only to the largest precinct in Brooklyn in
the number of allegations investigated against them in the last five years.119
Again, the reporting did not dwell in the culpability of any individual officer in the warrant squad but grew into the question of whether the legal
tactics afforded the warrant squad and police to surveil, use violence
against, and detain people should be limited—whether there was a common
problem for the public to collectively solve.120 The reporter, George Joseph,
contextualized an incident that observers likened to a violent kidnapping
and by analyzing the exoneration rates for similar past complaints, surfaced
the seed that caused the misconduct. It was not uniquely violent officers,
but an unrestrained power to use whatever tactics the squad felt were
needed—a thing we can collectively do something about, at least in theory.
In this way, having access to exonerated misconduct data—considered a
controversial aspect of repeal for some—was even more informative; and
an opportunity would have been missed had it been carved out of 50-a’s
repeal, because the real culprit is not just a person but a law.121 Research
has already demonstrated that police violence—like gun violence—spreads
like contagion.122 The availability of this data following 50-a’s repeal creates the possibility for the public to surgically track misconduct across
groupings of officers in order to identify disproportionately harmful tactics,

118. George Joseph, Warrant Squad in Protest Video Has History of Aggressive Tactics, Previously Secret Data Shows, GOTHAMIST (Aug. 1, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://gothamist.com/news/
warrant-squad-protest-video-has-history-aggressive-tactics-previously-secret-data-shows.
119. Id. (“The ProPublica data does not include all civilian complaints. But it does include
every complaint filed against an active duty police officer with at least one substantiated complaint. That’s 12,000 complaints against 4,000 officers. And those records show that in the last
five years, the CCRB investigated more misconduct allegations against members of the Warrant
Section than any other unit except for Brooklyn’s 75th Precinct in East New York. There were
263 allegations against the Warrant Section during that period, ranging from whipping guns out on
the street to property damage to using foul language.”).
120. Id. (“Giacolone, the former detective sergeant, said the public does not understand that
many of these aggressive tactics are legal, and are carried out to apprehend suspects wherever they
happen to be. But Wong, the Legal Aid lawyer, says the high number of complaints shows that the
NYPD needs to change its tactics.”).
121. Oleg Chernyavsky, Statement of Oleg Chernyavsky, in N.Y.S. STANDING COMM. ON
CODES HEARING ON CRL §50-A 44 (2019); see also Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68
Duke L. Rev. 839 (2019).
122. Katherine J. Wu, Study Finds Misconduct Spreads Among Police Officers Like Contagion, PBS (May 27, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/police-misconduct-peer-effects/.
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uses of violence, and other abuses of discretion and target campaigns to end
that recurring harm.123
The availability of misconduct data also created the potential for
ProPublica to review systemic accountability issues caused by the police
commissioner’s absolute authority over police disciplinary decisions and to
criticize the competency of the police commissioner to equitably and fairly
punish his own members.124 This reporting included two stories about officers pleading guilty to serious misconduct but having their pleas vacated
by the commissioner, supported by data from similar cases: “[b]etween
2014 and 2018, just over 60 of the most serious cases brought by the CCRB
ended up [like those examples].”125 The investigative report does not challenge the morality of any individual officer but rather the absolute discretion of the police commissioner to reject holding officers accountable based
on vague reasons like punishment being “detrimental” to the department.126
In what other context do judges decide not to convict and sentence someone
for a crime they have committed, absent jury nullification, because it would
be “detrimental” to society? Again, this reporting identifies something that
we can do something about and identifies a tension, namely between what
the police commissioner believes to be justice versus how the public defines
justice. It invites a discussion about how to better align those current extremely discordant definitions of justice and safety in a way that protects
everyone.
Each of these examples is meant to demonstrate this data’s potential
impact on the public conversation.127 There are many more examples as
news outlets dedicate entire sections of their websites to NYPD misconduct
reporting, delve into the data and focus on patterns of misconduct, follow
groupings of officers like the warrant squad, and identify problems with the
accountability system, all newly possible through the information we have
barely scratched the surface of.128
123. Jeffrey A. Butts, Caterina Gouvis Roman, Lindsay Bostwick & Jeremy R Porte, Cure
Violence: A Public Health Model to Reduce Gun Violence, ANNU. REV. PUBLIC HEALTH 39
(2015).
124. Mollie Simon, Lena V. Groeger, Eric Umansky & Adriana Gallardo, What It Looks Like
When the New York City Police Commissioner Has “Unchecked Power”, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 11,
2020), https://projects.propublica.org/nypd-unchecked-power/.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See generally, INVISIBLE INST., https://invisible.institute/jamie-kalven (Jamie Kalven, investigative reporter and founder of the invisible institute, has written a series of articles based on
this data, in addition to many more articles by other journalists); Investigations, Invisible Inst.,
(Repeal of 50-a also improved reporting on violence in jails in New York); Jan Ransom, In N.Y.C.
Jail System, Guards Often Lie About Excessive Force, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/04/24/nyregion/rikers-guards-lie-nyc-jails.html.
128. The NYPD Files: Investigating America’s Largest Police Force, PROPUBLICA (2021),
https://www.propublica.org/series/the-nypd-files; see also articles by George Joseph, investigations reporter for Gothamist, George Joseph, MUCK RACK (last visited Oct. 28, 2021), https://
muckrack.com/george-joseph/articles.
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Access to data and its impact on what information is made available,
whether through the courts or media, does not automatically translate into
effective policy reforms. Without support for community organizers to be
involved in and build on these efforts to push for policy change, it may do
nothing beyond document a problem for posterity.
E. The Impact of 50-a’s Repeal on Posterity
Our ability to tell the stories of our lives beyond our graves and share
past experiences, mistakes, and unintended consequences with future generations gives us the responsibility to tell them truthfully. Our responsibility
to document the lived experience of communities subjected to violent militarized police security forces is not just for the sake of telling the stories,
but to document an accurate narrative of the significant public health threat
that policing presents to an unignorable number of people in America, especially Black people.129 People and communities can tell their own stories
and find data to support or mollify questions about the commonness of a
problem. Academic researchers and historians will also document how policing, as a strategy of addressing public safety, was experienced by people
subjected to it. It is still early to survey academic research and historical
reviews of the decades of data previously shrouded by 50-a in New York
State, but academic researchers have used similar misconduct information
from Chicago to study racial disparities in police-civilian interactions,130
the spread of misconduct amongst groupings of officers,131 patterns of violent incidents between police and people with disabilities,132 and racial dis129. Len Strazewski, Why Police Brutality is a Matter of Public Health, AM. MED. ASS’N
(June 8, 2020), https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/health-equity/why-police-brutality-matter-public-health.
130. The following articles were based, at least partially, on data obtained and organized by
the Citizens Police Data Project in Chicago, IL and this list contains selections from articles
compiled by Public Data Works researchers Rajiv Sinclair and Sukari Stone. Bocar A. Ba, Dean
Knox, Jonathan Mummolo, & Roman Rivera, The Role of Officer Race and Gender in PoliceCivilian Interactions in Chicago, 371 SCI., 696, 696–702 (Feb. 12, 2021) (“Diversification is a
widely proposed policing reform, but its impact is difficult to assess. We used records of millions
of daily patrol assignments, determined through fixed rules and preassigned rotations that mitigate
self-selection, to compare the average behavior of officers of different demographic profiles working in comparable conditions.”); Andrea Marie Headley, Stewart J. D’Alessio, & Lisa
Stolzenberg, The Effect of a Complainant’s Race and Ethnicity on Dispositional Outcome in Police Misconduct Cases in Chicago, 10 RACE AND JUS., 43–61 (Jan. 1, 2020).
131. George Wood, Daria Roithmayr, & Andrew V. Papachristos, The Network Structure of
Police Misconduct, 5 SOCIUS 1, 2 (2019) (“Conventional explanations of police misconduct generally adopt a micro-level focus on deviant officers or a macro-level focus on the top-down organization of police departments. Between these levels are social networks of misconduct. This study
recreates these networks using data on 16,503 complaints and 15,811 police officers over a sixyear period in Chicago.”).
132. Harold A. Pollack & Keith Humphreys, Reducing Violent Incidents between Police Officers and People with Psychiatric or Substance use Disorders, THE ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
AND SOC. SCI. 166 (2020) (“This article describes evidence-based strategies designed to reduce the

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\18-1\UST103.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 31

19-APR-22

PUBLIC ACCESS TO POLICE MISCONDUCT RECORDS

12:37

73

parities across complainants in the investigative outcomes.133 Misconduct
data is vital to archive and preserve for future generations to learn from.
The data can be used, for example, as evidence of harm caused by the role
of policing in public safety.134
The above benefits of access to police misconduct information to the
public barely scratches the surface of what is possible with this data, given
the multiple implementation failures and delays presented by police, police
unions’ lawsuits, and city attorneys. It has not been a year since both the
CCRB and the NYPD, withholding their databases while police union’s petitions for injunctions were rejected on appeal, released public databases of
various degrees of information.135 “The CCRB’s database includes information on 34,811 active NYPD officers and 48,218 inactive officers, with
complaints dating back to 2000. Details about each complaint are limited to
the incident date, the type of complaint (force, abuse of authority, discourtesy, or offensive language), a one-or-two-word description of the allegation, and whether the complaint was substantiated.”136 The NYCLU
released a database on May 3, 2021, that
prevalence of police encounters with people in behavioral crisis (PBCs) and to make such encounters less dangerous for all parties when they do occur.”).
133. Sheryl Walter, Erik Gonzalez-Mulé, Cristiano L Guarana & Ernest O’Boyle, The Race
Discipline Gap: A Cautionary Tale on Archival Measures of Behavioral Misconduct, ELSEVIER:
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.obhdp.2020.03.010 (“Drawing from social psychological theories of social identity and aversive
racism, we examined the extent to which Black employees (in contrast to White employees) are
more likely to have formal incidences of misconduct documented in their employment records,
even when there are no racial differences in the number of allegations of misconduct.”).
134. Connor Perrett, The National Archives Can’t Allow ICE to Destroy Records About Sexual
Assault and Detainee Deaths, a Federal Judge Ruled, INSIDER (Mar. 13, 2021, 2:00 PM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/ice-nara-cant-destroy-sexual-assault-death-records-2021-3 (“A federal
judge . . . ruled that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the National Archives and
Records Administration must preserve records relating to sexual assault, abuse, and detainee
deaths because of their ‘research’ value.”).
135. Caitlyn Jordan, After Section 50-a Repeal, New York Police Unions are Fighting in Court
to Keep Misconduct Records Secret. So Far, They’re Losing., REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM PRESS
(Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.rcfp.org/50-a-repeal-police-misconduct/; Benjamin Weiser, Police
Unions Lose Bid to Keep Disciplinary Records a Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 28, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/02/16/nyregion/nypd-discipline-records-ruling.html; Beryl Lipton, Buffalo Judge Denies Police Union Attempt to Block Police Disciplinary Records, MUCKROCK (Oct.
8, 2020), https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2020/oct/08/buffalo-judges-denies-policeunion-attempt-to-bloc/; Jon Campbell & Beryl Lipton, New York 50-a Repeal: Six Months Later,
Police Find Ways to Shield Disciplinary Records, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Dec. 22, 2020, 10:19
AM), https://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/politics/albany/2020/12/22/new-yorkstate-50-a-repeal-six-months-later-police-shielding-public-records/3964062001/; Will Cleveland
& Sean Lahman, NYCLU Seeks to Intervene in Locust Club Suit Over Release of Disciplinary
Records, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Dec. 16, 2020, 5:01 AM), https://www.democratandchronicle.
com/story/news/2020/12/16/nyclu-files-suit-against-rochester-ny-police-department-over-records/
3904340001/.
136. James D. Walsh, The City Just Released a Massive NYPD-Misconduct Database, INTELLIGENCER (Mar. 4, 2021), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/03/the-city-just-published-a-mas
sive-nypd-misconduct-database.html.
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is a repository of complaints made by the public on record at the
CCRB. These complaints span two distinct periods: the time since
the CCRB started operating as an independent city agency outside
the NYPD in 1994 and the prior period when the CCRB operated
within the NYPD. The database includes 279,644 unique complaint records involving 102,121 incidents and 48,757 active or
former NYPD officers. The database does not include pending
complaints for which the CCRB has not completed an investigation as of April 2021.137
NYCLU’s database also adds a layer of filtering to its search queries
for more nuanced searches. The NYPD’s database, in contrast, is only
searchable and viewable by officer name and contains only “partial disciplinary records dating back to 2014 in an online dashboard containing profiles
of all 35,000 active police officers. Separately, officials posted redacted
copies of more than 200 decisions by judges in administrative trials, going
back to 2017.”138
Reporters across the state are struggling to get responsive data for
smaller cities and towns upstate. In-depth investigative reports and academic research about the NYPD that relies on their responding with data
requested post-repeal may still be in the works. New York City lawyers are
still trying to make civil rights attorneys agree to protective order stipulations for police misconduct information.139 Smaller police departments are
taking even more defiant positions regarding releasing records. In response
to an open records request from MuckRock for “allegations of misconduct
against current or former officers and any discipline the department imposed,” Manlius Police Department replied with a bill for $47,504.140 Other
departments are claiming that repeal of 50-a only impacts records created
following repeal and not to past records.141 In other words, we know that
we still do not have all the information available to hold police accountable,
but what we have has already proven powerful.

137. NYPD Misconduct Complaint Database, NYCLU: ACLU OF N.Y. (Apr. 2021), https://
www.nyclu.org/en/campaigns/nypd-misconduct-database.
138. Southall, supra note 4.
139. Graham Rayman, NYC Still Fighting Release of Cops’ Disciplinary Records in Federal
Lawsuits Against NYPD, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 7, 2021), https://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/nyc-crime/ny-nyc-fighting-release-nypd-discipline-records-20210208-wem3zbkh5jdptmn
jnirckae3bi-story.html.
140. Campbell and Lipton, supra note 135 (“In June, the Manlius Police Department received
an open-records request from MuckRock, a nonprofit news site. The request sought documents
detailing any allegations of misconduct against current or former officers and any discipline the
department imposed. The department replied with a bill. For $47,504.”).
141. Campbell and Lipton, supra note 135.
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PART III - THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF INDEPENDENT POLICE MISCONDUCT
DATABASES
The introduction of official police misconduct databases made public
by government agencies like the NYPD and the CCRB do not fill the shoes
of an independent misconduct database that can challenge the government
to broaden the scope of data they make available and analyze the data
through collaborative partnerships. This includes partnerships with communities impacted by police violence, police reform organizations, local journalists, academic researchers, lawyers, courts, policymakers, and other
stakeholders. Partnerships with a variety of stakeholders can identify patterns of conduct that both impact communities and may have a policy solution. Independent databases define the scope and presentation of
misconduct made public.142 For example, when NYPD released its database
of police misconduct, Julie Ciccolini tweeted entries to the Legal Aid Society’s website, CAPstat.org, and compared them to entries on NYPD’s
database that presented officers with long histories of misconduct as having
no “applicable” misconduct for the website.143 Independent databases are
142. An Introduction to the Citizens Data Project, INVISIBLE INST,, https://invisible.institute/
police-data (last visited Oct. 2, 2021). The Citizen Police Data Project has processed over thirty
years of internal misconduct records. This website allows the public viewer to engage with the
data at multiple levels with options to analyze data by individual police officer, by neighborhood,
by ward, and by district. It also provides the demographics of the complainants or officers and the
category of misconduct (Chicago); CAPSTAT: NYC FED. CIV. RIGHTS LAWSUIT DATA, 2015 TO
JUNE 2018, https://www.capstat.nyc/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2021) (NYC); ACLU Unveils Interactive
Map Showing Alleged Police Misconduct in Massachusetts, ACLU MASS., https://www.aclum.
org/en/news/aclu-unveils-interactive-map-showing-alleged-police-misconduct-massachusetts (last
visited Sept. 6, 2021); OPEN DATA POLICING, https://opendatapolicing.com/ (last visited Sept. 6,
2021) (North Carolina, Maryland, Illinois); ACCOUNTABLE NOW, https://www.accountablenow.com/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2021) (National); COPMONITOR, https://sfpublicdefender.org/cop
monitor/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2021) (San Francisco); COP CRISIS, http://copcrisis.com/ (last visited
Sept. 6, 2021) (National); DOCUMENTING FERGUSON, http://digital.wustl.edu/ferguson/ (last visited
Sept. 6, 2021) (Missouri); FATAL ENCOUNTERS, https://fatalencounters.org/ (last visited Sept. 6,
2021) (National); Police Shootings 2016 Database, THE WASH. POST, https://www.washington
post.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2016/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2021) (National); Fatal
State Violence, ARCHCITY DEFENDERS, https://www.archcitydefenders.org/fatalstateviolence (last
visited Sept. 6, 2021) (National); POLICE SHOOTING DATABASE (2020), https://robarguns.com/
kbp2020 (last visited Sept. 6, 2021) (National); MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, https://mapping
policeviolence.org/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2021) (National); OPENOVERSIGHT, https://openoversight.
lucyparsonslabs.com/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2021) (National); OPEN POLICE, https://openpolice.org/
(last visited Sept. 6, 2021) (National); THE STANFORD OPEN POLICING PROJECT, https://openpolic
ing.stanford.edu/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2021) (National); TEXAS JUSTICE INITIATIVE, https://texas
justiceinitiative.org/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2021) (Texas); The Force Report, NJ.COM PROJECTS &
INVESTIGATIONS, https://force.nj.com/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2021) (New Jersey); Reducing Use of
Force by Law Enforcement, STATE OF N. J.: DEPT. OF L. & PUBLIC SAFETY, https://
www.njoag.gov/force/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2021) (New Jersey); THE PROBLEMATIC, http://
theproblematic.org/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2021) (Los Angeles, CA). Jackie Zummato generously
shared this list with the author.
143. Julie Ciccolini (@ciccolinijulie), TWITTER (Mar. 10, 2021, 9:40 AM), https://twitter.com/
ciccolinijulie/status/1369674551051902978; see also Nick Muscavage, NJ’s Police Use-Of-Force
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needed to test the validity of the department’s claims in serving transparency values.
Government does not have the exclusive monopoly on creating or collecting misconduct data, and its “official” databases should not be viewed
as containing the universe of police misconduct information worth capturing for the purposes of informing policy change.144 Many people do not
trust the government to police the government, and they seek redress
through other options, for example, going to the media, to a lawyer, or to a
community-based organization.
Independent databases also encourage more interactive analysis with
the data beyond individual officer name searches and organize a rich set of
data that can challenge departments’ claims to transparency, their role in
promoting public safety, and their capacity to hold their officers accountable for misconduct. In addition to the information released by government
databases, independent databases can compile a broader universe of information from federal and state lawsuits, news articles, notices of claim,
criminal court decisions, etc.145
Using open records requests, independent databases have the potential
to score large datasets of officers’ pedestrian and vehicle stop data, arrest
history data, misconduct data, and data about their training, overtime, salary, and rank to understand how officer conduct impacts their career success at the NYPD.146 At the same time, independent databases for oversight
data can support communities’ fights to maintain and gain access to this
data so that its value is not discredited or undermined in foreseeable future
fights to make it secret again, or make portions of it secret again.147 Already, police unions have tried to modernize their attacks on transparency
of misconduct records by claiming it is “doxxing” and “data-dumping.”148
The public should expect to fight to maintain its ability to access these
records. Independent databases will help them anchor that fight by being
dedicated to demonstrating that value through community, journalist, academic, and policy partnerships.
Database Falls Short, Experts Say, LAW360 (Apr. 18, 2021, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1375959.
144. Glorioso & Pavlovic, supra note 4. NYC’s law department responded that they refused to
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CONCLUSION
Defending public access to police misconduct information is vital for not
just holding police officers accountable in all the ways described above but
also for holding police departments, elected officials, and the very idea of
policing accountable. That does not mean transparency should be equated
with victory; it is not the end of police violence. Transparency is, however,
an important tool for movements fighting for accountability and transformation of public safety. Based on how police have historically tightly controlled access to that information, it may even hold the potential for deep
transformation. To fully explore that potential, independent databases that
obtain, organize, and open police misconduct information must be
supported.
That said—not all independent databases will be able to fully explore
that potential equally. Partnerships with community-based organizers that
inform the database design, set guardrails for how the data is used, and most
importantly, dictate what policy reforms the data is used to support, are key
for the organizations building independent databases. Only by working in
partnership with community organizers can transparency advocates and
database builders ensure their efforts are supporting community empowerment and not the status quo.

